While the collapse of the Soviet Union altered tremendously the configuration of power in Eurasia, the nationality issues that played such a critical role in fueling the Soviet collapse have hardly dissipated, but remain very much a part of the Eurasian landscape. Issues associated with cultural difference are openly discussed, and groups engage in autonomous self-organization in ways that could not have been imagined in Soviet times.
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I
t is always a sobering experience to read one's writings from two decades ago. The article that i was asked to write in 1991 for what was then Problems of Communism was supposed to examine the nationality implications of the august 1991 coup. it was written in that liminal period between the august 1991 coup and the December 1991 Belovezh Forest agreement, at which the final dissolution of the soviet Union was announced by the presidents of russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. at the time that i wrote the essay, efforts were still being made to craft together some form of new soviet political community, and some believed (and still believe today) that such an effort might have saved the soviet state had the august coup not occurred. i took strong issue with this perspective. i argued instead that the time had long passed for construction of a viable soviet state, and that the august 1991 coup represented "the final nationalities crisis of a decaying and exhausted political order." "rather than causing the disintegration of the Ussr, the events of august merely furnished the setting in which that disintegration transpired, providing a cathartic end to an empire whose legitimating myth had been punctured, whose institutions were crumbling, and which was clearly headed toward collapse in any case." 1 in the second part of the essay, i laid out my doubts that efforts to construct a post-soviet international political community-confederal, economic, or regional-would prove viable in the long run.
even with the benefit of two decades of hindsight, i believe my assessments were essentially correct. The events of august 1991 were set in motion by four years of massive unrest within the Ussr and the collapse of soviet rule in eastern europe. already by December 1990, nine months before the august coup, the soviet state found itself in a severe political crisis. not only had practically every republic and autonomous republic declared its sovereignty vis-à-vis the center, but public perceptions of the impending break-up of the soviet state had also grown, with more than one-quarter of the population believing that it had already become "inevi table." 2 Lithuania, estonia, Latvia, Moldavia, georgia, and armenia had made clear their intentions to secede, while azerbaijan had been prevented from doing so only by a bloody military intervention. Ukraine had indicated that it would remain part of a union only if allowed to retain its own currency and army. The soviet and russian governments were in constant conflict over the reach of their respective sovereignties, undermining completely plans for introducing economic reforms. in the meantime, the soviet economy had collapsed and store shelves were bare due to the disruption of commerce between republics and consumer fears of pending price rises. This deep crisis was precisely what precipitated gorbachev's infamous "turn to the right" in november 1990, in which he allied himself with conservative forces in the Party apparatus, the secret police, and the military in an attempt to save the soviet state by cracking down on separatist republics and replacing Boris Yeltsin's russian government with more amenable administrators.
When these tactics proved unviable by spring 1991 (partly because gorbachev had no stomach for the kind of violence that they entailed), the soviet leader changed course once again, jettisoning this hard-line approach and reopening negotiations with nine union republics over a new union treaty. The agreement that these negotiations produced-which russia, kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Byelorussia were set to sign on august 20 had the august coup not intervened-would have created a confederal government in which the republics had the right to annul any central government laws that contradicted their own, the republics controlled central government finances, and nearly all economic property (including subsoil wealth) would have been transferred to the republics. each republic would have had the right to establish its own diplomatic relations abroad. republics would have retained the right to secede from the union even after they signed on to the treaty. 3 Despite the attempts of some in hindsight to paint the treaty as a feasible solution to the country's problems, 4 anyone familiar with its provisions would have known that it was nothing of the sort. not only did it legitimize the partial break-up of the country, but the governmental arrangements that it put in place left most of the major questions of governance unresolved and were likely to "become the source of new frictions and conflicts . . . strengthening the process of the collapse of the federal state." 5 This was obvious to gorbachev's erstwhile conservative allies in the Party apparatus, the military, and the secret police, and the august coup (which occurred on the day before the agreement was to be signed by the five republics) was their failed attempt to prevent it from happening. although my assessment of the events of august 1991 and its immediate aftermath was fundamentally accurate, i was perhaps too categorical about the absence of possibilities for reintegration among the post-soviet states. The Commonwealth of independent states (Cis) has never really amounted to much of a community and plays little more than a symbolic role in the region. 6 But what was certainly poorly predicted in the essay was the renewed rise of russian power in eurasia by the early 2000s, fueled by the growth of russia's energy exports, which has provided opportunities for new forms of informal, neoimperial integration across the region. With the exception of Central asia, regional integration projects have not gone very far in eurasia, as i had believed two decades. However, the emergence of islamic extremism in Central asia, unforeseeable when writing in 1991, breathed life into the shanghai Cooperation Organization-a serious effort at regional cooperation among russia, the Central asian states, and China in the security realm. 7 in addition to the accuracy of our analyses twenty years ago, we have been asked to address the question of whether the collapse of the soviet Union solved the problems that led to the august 1991 coup in the first place. The question is somewhat misformulated as applied to the relationship between cultural identity and state power in eurasia, since, as most experts on nationalism and ethnicity would readily admit, identity issues cannot in any real sense be "solved." indeed, the soviet attempt to solve its nationalities challenges bred enormous violence and was a significant part of what led to the collapse of the soviet Union in the first place. Moreover, the mistaken belief that the soviet Union had succeeded in solving the "nationalities question" because they had managed to squelch significant challenges to their rule on the basis of ethnicity only heightened the misunderstandings that soviet officials brought to the nationalities sphere once politics liberalized under glasnost. as many scholars have noted, there was an essential ambiguity to the soviet record in the nationalities sphere over the Ussr's seven-decade history. On the one hand, soviet rulers sought to create a modernized, multinational state in which citizens identified with an overarching soviet identity, knowledge of russian as a second language was promoted alongside native language proficiency, and cultural and literary expression within strict political bounds was promoted. On the other hand, soviet rule was also a history of enormous violence, social engineering, territorial expansion, and cultural control, with an underlying sense of a russian-dominated hierarchy. some groups (slavs and minorities within the russian republic, in particular) were subjected to more rigorous attempts at cultural and linguistic assimilation. The soviet passport system, in which every individual was formally assigned to a nationality on the basis of the nationality of his or her parents, helped to ensure that everyday experience was permeated with a consciousness of cultural categories. While there were periods of relative quiescence within the nationalities sphere, and while attitudes toward the soviet order among its minorities varied significantly across time and space, soviet nationalities policy hardly solved anything. indeed, in the eyes of most analysts, it was a central reason for the demise of Ussr in the first place. While the regime was successful at times in fostering a sense of common soviet identity within certain segments of the non-russian population, soviet policies also reinforced and institutionalized national identities and left a legacy of historical and cultural grievances that festered and could not be dealt with openly. some might be tempted to argue that the soviet collapse solved the problem of national domination in eurasia by ending the soviet empire, breaking it up into national parts, and providing for the aspirations to independence of a significant number of groups. Moreover, most post-soviet states are considerably less diverse than was the Ussr-not only because the scale of the state was downsized, but also because the violent ethnic conflicts and political pressures on minorities that accompanied the soviet collapse led to a mass exodus of minorities, transforming most states into more homogenous communities.
8 nevertheless, issues of the relationship of cultural difference to the state remain conspicuous. as we will see, the picture presented by a comparison of soviet and post-soviet nationality challenges is decidedly mixed: in some contexts and respects, one might judge the situation facing minorities to have improved in comparison to soviet days, while in other contexts and respects, it has deteriorated significantly.
To be sure, many of the problems inherited by the post-soviet states in the nationalities sphere were directly created by soviet power, and the legacy of soviet nationalities policies for post-soviet power remain pervasive. soviet-created situations like the return of Crimean Tatars or Meskhetian Turks to their ancestral homes are still a source of conflict and have defied easy resolution on the part of successor states. Moreover, post-soviet national and ethnic conflicts continue to be structured by the contours of the soviet ethno-federal system. in an attempt to contain the unrest that might have developed had the breakdown of states in the region continued indefinitely, the boundaries of the union republics were quickly acknowledged by the international community as the sole basis for the post-soviet international order; despite the wars that the soviet collapse unleashed over the status of Chechnya, abkhazia, south Ossetia, karabakh, and Transnistria, separatist or irredentist claims that seek to alter the boundaries of the union republics have yet to gain widespread recognition within the international community. attitudes toward soviet power remain one of the major vectors of identity across the region. Those groups that mobilized in large numbers against the soviet state in the glasnost period (Balts, georgians, and Western Ukrainians) have in general sought quicker integration with the West as a way of avoiding the possibility of a renewed russian domination, while many russians have come to view the soviet past with nostalgia, longing for the sense of international status and respect once accorded to the soviet superpower. indeed, such fears and yearnings underpin much of the legitimacy of post-soviet government.
The collapse of the soviet state also created new problems and situations, with each post-soviet state confronted by its own significant issues of the relationship of cultural identity to political power. instead of one large multinational state, there are now fifteen. independence has exacerbated the minority issues faced within most republics. it has raised fears over the imposition of a new cultural hegemony and domination-this time emanating from the newly recognized "nations" that now dominate their respective states. The fact that, as rogers Brubaker made clear, almost all of the post-soviet states are "nationalizing states" that have sought to establish the cultural hegemony of their titular groups in an attempt to build legitimacy has only compounded the issue. 9 so by what criteria should we judge whether the postsoviet republics have managed their cultural challenges successfully or represent an improvement upon soviet power? essentially, when we talk about the effective multiethnic state, we are talking about states that engage in five related practices.
First, violence and coercion as tools of cultural politics must be marginal to political practice. Coercion and violence rarely solve cultural conflicts and usually only create new grievances revolving around the very use of violence.
10 in this sense, "solutions" that are imposed on society are just as problematic as "solutions" that are violently imposed on states by ethnic movements. They create legacies that haunt interethnic relations long after the violence recedes.
second, as the soviet experience tells us, an open public discourse over issues associated with cultural difference is needed in order to manage cultural conflict consensually. Certainly, we cannot simply equate the absence of conflict with a positive outcome if the possibilities for expressing grievances are at the same time curtailed. some degree of conflict over issues associated with cultural difference is a natural part of any multiethnic society, and problems will only fester when a public discourse over issues of cultural pluralism is choked off.
Third, the cultural rights of the individual must be respected, minimizing discrimination against individuals on the basis of cultural difference and providing opportunities for them to practice their culture and religion freely, to form and associate within cultural communities, to learn the language of their chosen community, and to select their identities freely. Here, i emphasize the cultural rights of the individual rather than the group, although the issue itself is a controversial one.
11 nevertheless, the idea of the cultural rights of groups has tended to predominate in the political practice and discourse on nationalities within eurasia; what has been missing, rather, is sensitivity to what should be the individual's cultural rights.
Fourth, under the effective management of cultural difference, political processes give voice to minorities, so that the policies that are produced take into serious consideration the interests of all sides to the conflict. The effective multiethnic state does not force minorities into exit, but instead, by allowing voice, breeds minority loyalty. in particular, when political processes contain incentives for politicians to take into consideration the needs of minorities, win-win outcomes are more likely to occur. 12 Finally, the effective multiethnic state attempts to address the sources of inequality between groups and aspirations for social justice among minorities. it cannot let deep-seated grievances fester, but needs to address them proactively, to prevent them from becoming the cause of violent conflict. armed with these five criteria, let me now turn to assess whether and in what respects the post-soviet states represent an improvement on soviet power in the nationalities sphere.
the Marginalization of Violence as a tool of Cultural Politics
For the soviet regime, violence and coercion were everyday tools of cultural politics. The use of violence and coercion as means of managing nationalities policies was far more than simply the genocidal policies pursued by stalin during World War ii. Violence played a central role in pulling the russian empire together under soviet rule in the first place, in soviet assaults on traditional social structures and cultural authorities in the 1920s, in the collectivization drives, purges of national communists, and assertion of russian dominance in the 1930s, in sovietizing newly conquered territories in the 1940s, in the assimilationist policies put in place in the 1950s, and in the marginalization of national dissidents in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Of course, much of how one judges the post-soviet record depends on which period of soviet rule one chooses as a comparison point. The late soviet regime lacked the kind of massacre deeply embedded within the logic of stalinism; it featured instead a highly institutionalized form of coercion that effectively kept social peace while targeting those individuals (rather than groups) who sought to challenge it or who violated the boundaries that it set.
in comparison with the soviet record as a whole and its tens of millions of victims, there is no doubt that violence and coercion play a much less significant role in how the post-soviet states deal with their minorities. This is due in part to the effect of global norms about how one is supposed to deal with minority aspirations and the rise of human rights regimes (eU accession, for instance, played an important role in influencing policies toward minorities in the western portions of the former Ussr). However, it is also a reflection of the fact that post-soviet governments have not sought to engineer minority identities and beliefs on the same scale as was true of soviet power.
Violence nevertheless remains a palpable part of ethnic politics in parts of the region-especially over the issue of separatism. Only in one case (the wars in Chechnya) has the level of violence approximated stalinist levels; estimates of the number of civilian deaths in the two Chechen wars number around 200,000 to 250,000 (or about a fifth of the entire Chechen population). By contrast, the number of civilian deaths in the five other ethnic civil wars that occurred in eurasia after the soviet collapse (the karabakh conflict, the first and second georgian-Ossetian wars, the war in abkhazia, and the Transnistria conflict) has been comparatively low-probably totaling no more than 40,000 in all. 13 still, the number refugees forced to flee their homes as a result of these wars approached 2 million. Moreover, terrorism associated with ethnic conflict (a marginal phenomenon in soviet days) has become a significant issue within post-soviet russia. in this respect, judging the post-soviet record on violence and coercion relative to its past would depend upon which past one chooses as a reference point. While there is no doubt that ethnically related violence has increased tremendously in comparison to the late soviet period, post-soviet patterns of ethnic violence pale in significance to the massive coercion unleashed by stalin.
What has most certainly increased since the soviet collapse, however, are the more dispersed and localized forms of violence that have their roots in social tensions and competition for power and resources rather than state massacre or war-incidents such as the violence in kondopoga, the interethnic riots in Osh, clashes over Crimean Tatar squatters, or Cossack attacks on minorities in krasnodar krai. incidents such as these, of course, occurred in soviet times. However, their prevalence since the soviet collapse (especially in comparison with the late soviet period) is conspicuous. similarly, in russia hate crime has become a serious phenomenon in a way that simply could never have been imagined under soviet rule. These more dispersed forms of ethnically related violence have occurred without the support of the central governments of post-soviet states, and in many cases despite their efforts to prevent or eliminate them. in short, with respect to the use of violence to deal with cultural conflict, the post-soviet period represents in certain respects improvement over the soviet record, but in other respects deterioration. The forms and scale assumed by violence have transformed, but violence and coercion in some contexts remain a part of cultural politics.
Open Discourse over Cultural Difference
The absence of an open discourse over issues of cultural difference in the soviet Union left it vulnerable to the kinds of explosions of nationalism that ultimately pulled it apart. There was no freedom for autonomous ethnic, cultural, or religious organization, and given the absence of freedom of expression and the tight control that was exercised over nationality affairs, there was little possibility for open expression of issues short of extrasystemic mobilization or violence. Conflict is a natural part of hu-man life, and behind the curtain of the officially imposed accord, conflict over cultural issues continued throughout the soviet period. For example, in the case of the complaints of the karabakh armenians about discrimination against them by the azerbaijani authorities, the issue was periodically raised through petitions, letter-writing campaigns, and official appeals by local Party officials. But because of the absence of any regularized open political process, these efforts to raise real concerns about discrimination were easily ignored by Moscow, no actions were taken by the soviet government to alleviate the situation, and those who complained were subjected to persecution by the azerbaijani authorities.
14 it was hardly surprising, then, that once the possibilities for political expression opened under glasnost, these issues produced a sudden explosion of nationalist mobilization and activism that the soviet regime could not effectively contain, and conflict over the status of karabakh quickly became the dominating issue within political life and a source of instability throughout the region.
in many post-soviet states limitations on political and cultural expression are now dramatically different. in most of the region (with perhaps the exception of Central asia) issues associated with cultural difference are openly discussed in the media and within political institutions in a way that simply could not have been imagined in the soviet Union after the 1920s. Minority civil society has also become widespread, as ethnic organizations aimed at protecting the interests and rights of local minorities have proliferated throughout the former soviet Union (although in much of Central asia they continue to be harassed and find it difficult to operate in the open). in russia, for instance, ethnic groups outside of their own federal unit or that have no federal unit of their own can form their own national cultural autonomies. Hundreds of these have formed at the local level throughout the russian Federation since legislation was enacted in 1996, and a subset have been allowed to establish organizations at the federal level. While subjecting minority associations to some degree of regulation and governmental control (not all groups, for instance, are accorded the status of a national cultural autonomy), this has provided minorities with greater access to the state, opened up space for debate on the issues facing minorities, and has helped to diffuse conflict at the local level. 15 nevertheless, in many parts of eurasia discourse on ethnic and national issues is still regulated and restricted. Throughout the former soviet Union, restrictions on selforganization and expression have fallen especially hard on groups suspected of harboring separatist aspirations. Like some european states, some post-soviet states have adopted official laws against incitement of national hatred. While aimed against extremism of all sorts, they are selectively enforced in ways that suppress minority voices to the dislike of regimes. 16 in russia, for example, the Tatar pro-independence activist Fauzia Bayramova was prosecuted under russia's law against incitement of ethnic hatred (article 282 of the russian Criminal Code) after writing an open letter calling on the international community to recognize Tatarstan's independence-an appeal that she made at the very time when russia had recognized the independence of south Ossetia from georgia. 17 While minorities have found their discourse regulated, legal restrictions against inciting ethnic hatred have not stemmed in any way the growing tide of extremist rhetoric emanating from right-wing groups associated with dominant ethnic groups.
Respect for the Cultural Rights of Individuals
a key condition for an effective multiethnic state is respect for the cultural rights of individuals. This involves the minimization of discrimination on the basis of cultural difference, provision of opportunities for practicing culture and religion freely, the ability to associate within cultural communities, opportunities for individuals to learn the language of the group with which they identify, and the ability of individuals to choose their own identity freely. The soviet record in this respect was mixed. On the one hand, the soviet state provided enormous opportunities for upward mobility for most minority groups through education and various affirmative action programs. some minority cultures and languages were promoted, while others (particularly non-russian slavic languages and cultures and those of groups within autonomous republics or without any federal unit) were squelched in an effort to promote cultural agglomeration. religious practice was subjected to extensive repression, and the content of cultural expression was actively censored. Moreover, individuals did not have the right to choose their identities freely. rather, individual ethnic identities were primordialized and fixed in the soviet passport system. The fixation of ethnic identity in soviet internal passports functioned as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it allowed the regime to promote minority individuals to positions of responsibility and to ensure opportunities for education and upward mobility. On the other hand, it made it easier for officials at all levels of the state hierarchy to discriminate against individuals on the basis of ethnicity, should they wish to do so. a trend in many of the post-soviet states has been the individualization of ethnic identity 18 -epitomized most clearly in the abolition of nationality as an item of identification in internal passport documents. in 1997 the Yeltsin administration removed the infamous "Fifth Point" that identified nationality in the soviet passport from post-soviet russian internal passports. ironically, the move was opposed in many non-russian republics of russia because it inhibited efforts to promote affirmative action.
19 nationality remains an item of information in the internal passports of Central asian states; in other countries (Belarus, for instance) it is an optional category. in estonia, noncitizens (primarily russianspeakers) carry an internal passport of a different color, making them easily identifiable. Of course, even though the individualization of ethnic identity may eliminate one marker (passport identification) that could be used to identify ethnic minorities, numerous other markers (last name, physical complexion, language use, etc.) have always existed alongside passport identification that can also be used for the same purpose. although we do not have good data to make a judgment with any certainty, it seems likely that discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is actually more widespread in most post-soviet states than was true in soviet times, despite the elimination of passport identity in some contexts.
This is so for a number of reasons, but perhaps the most important of these has been the nationalization of the state. The soviet Union may have openly promoted russian second-language acquisition and fostered linguistic russification among certain groups. Certainly russians predominated in central state institutions despite affirmative action policies at lower levels of the state. But the Ussr never openly identified itself as a russian state, russian religious and cultural expression was subjected to significant restriction alongside those of other groups, and public norms of "internationalism" promoted a relatively tolerant societal environment, sanctioning expressions of extreme nationalism. Perhaps the key legacy that the soviet ethno-federal system left behind was that most of the states of the region officially aim to represent the aspirations of a specific ethnic group and to promote one particular language or culture over others. While most post-soviet states officially proclaim themselves multiethnic communities, they also simultaneously claim to represent a particular ethnic group, in practice promote one culture over others, and use nationalist values rather than internationalist norms as the basis for their legitimation.
The expectation that one culture should be promoted over others has been the source of considerable discrimination against individual cultural preferences by the state throughout the region. For example, many governments in the region have issued restrictive regulations for certain religious groups, identifying them as "foreign," limiting their activities, or subjecting them to the vagaries of local administration. russia's 1997 legislation on religion identifies four religions as "traditional" to russia (russian Orthodoxy, Judaism, islam, and Buddhism). it has promoted a kind of multiculturalism that incorporates these particular minorities into the state. although embracing some minority religions, the russian state has also established very close relations with the russian Orthodox Church and has engaged in actions to promote its interests. at the same time, roman Catholics, Protestants, and other groups identified as "foreign" have been subjected to significant discrimination by state officials in the provision of visas, access to buildings, and so forth. although identification of nationality on passports has been abolished in russia, the persistence of registration for permanent residence, excessive licensing regulations for business, and arbitrary identity checks by police provide local officials with numerous opportunities to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity. 20 aside from forms of official discrimination, the nationalization of post-soviet states has also created openings for more extreme expressions of nationalism and xenophobia within post-soviet societies-particularly (but not exclusively) in russia. norms of interethnic trust and cooperation still predominate in many parts of the former soviet Union. in some areas rates of ethnic intermarriage have increased substantially since the collapse. in postsoviet Moscow and in Latvia, for example, where ethnic intermarriage had been quite common before the soviet collapse, they have grown even more common than in soviet times. 21 nevertheless, repeated surveys have shown that about half of russia's inhabitants find the slogan "russia for the russians" appealing. 22 The slogan figured prominently in the riots unleashed by 5,000 nationalist soccer fans in central Moscow in December 2010. racially motivated crimes have increased significantly in major cities of russia, particularly against Caucasians and Central asians. But societal discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is not just a russian phenomenon. indeed, research shows that non-russians within their own ethno-federal units in russia are also relatively intolerant toward migrants of other nationalities. 23 Moreover, ethnic discrimination remains a significant social phenomenon within all the post-soviet states. For example, a study comparing the wages of male estonians with those of male russian-speakers in estonia found a substantial wage gap in favor of estonians, even controlling for language skills, education, industry, and occupation-implying a widespread societal discrimination on the basis of ethnicity practiced within estonia. 24 The end of the Ussr has made life more difficult and uncertain for minorities in many areas of the former soviet Union, as internationalist norms gave way to nationalist agendas.
Opportunities for Minority Voice within Institutions of Power
soviet ethno-federalism may have provided formal representation of minorities within soviet institutions, but there were relatively few channels through which minorities could openly voice their interests. Minority interests were filtered through the Communist Party hierarchy, which was dominated at its peak by russians and slavs. Minorities were often provided with formal representation within representative institutions in proportions that were close to their numbers within the population at large. More often than not, however, formal representation came with little opportunity to shape policy, as the concerns of central bureaucracies in Moscow predominated, and hierarchical control limited the possibilities for interest articulation.
Post-soviet government in this respect presents a very different picture. On the one hand, formal representation of minorities within central state institutions has declined sharply relative to soviet times. in Lithuania, for example, Lithuanians are significantly over-represented in the seimas, as are russians in the russian Duma. 25 in the 2010 kyrgyz parliament, only 3 percent of deputies were Uzbek, although Uzbeks constitute 15 percent of the population of kyrgyzstan. 26 On the other hand, in most (though not all) post-soviet states, minority representatives within legislative institutions are often able to voice concerns much more openly than was the case in the Ussr. studies have shown that within the post-communist states more generally, where legislatures have real power and minorities are represented in them in greater numbers, ethnic rebellion and violence are much less likely.
27 in short, voice matters for preventing violent conflict.
The issue of the absence of minority voice within institutions of power remains a concern throughout the region. in some contexts progress has been made. Moldova effectively managed its conflict with the gagauz community through an innovative scheme harking back to soviet methods of the 1920s: the creation of a gagauzYeri autonomous region consisting of noncontiguous territories and villages with majority gagauz populations that has effective autonomy over education, culture, and local development and controls its own police force. 28 By contrast, in estonia and Latvia restrictive citizenship rules disenfranchised large numbers of minority-group members within national representative institutions, although noncitizens were allowed to participate in local elections and have gained significant representation at the local level. Under european Union influence, a gradual integration of minorities into national political life has occurred, altering significantly the political balance within state institutions and generating majority anxieties.
in most states of the region, however, minorities remain locked out of power, and there are relatively few incentives in place for politicians to take minority interests into consideration. Moreover, the trend in a number of states has been toward greater centralization rather than toward more autonomy, leaving minorities within ethno-federal units in less control of their own affairs. in the 1990s, driven by the wave of declarations of sovereignty that accompanied the soviet collapse, russia became an extremely decentralized asymmetric ethno-federalism. Between 1994 and 1998 Yeltsin signed forty-five separate bilateral agreements with the federal units of russia. Many of these agreements provided conditions for extensive autonomy for ethno-federal units, granting control over revenues generated by natural resources, setting restrictions (based on ethnic criteria) on who could hold office, and injecting ambiguity into whose laws ultimately were sovereign. in the case of Tatarstan, the agreement provided the republic with the right to diplomatic representation abroad, and for much of the 1990s Bashkortostan did not recognize the validity of federal court rulings on its territory. 29 Under Putin a package of reforms was enacted that reversed much of this autonomy. seven federal districts were established, each with its own presidential envoy and heavily staffed by the FsB, to ensure implementation of federal laws within federal subunits. in the wake of the Beslan tragedy in 2004, Putin abolished elections of local governors and republican presidents and assumed the power to appoint them, subject to the approval of the republican and provincial legislatures (although the president can dissolve the local legislature if it refuses his choice). a campaign ensued to bring local laws and constitutions into line with federal law. Changes were also made to laws on political parties and on elections to the Duma that undermined much of the possibility for ethnic representation within national institutions, marginalizing minorities within the national political process. in many ways, the changes to the selection of local leaders introduced under Putin established relationships of central control and dependency similar to those that existed through the nomenklatura list under communism. Under Putin and Medvedev, a trend toward appointment of outsiders to administer ethno-federal units also appeared, in a number of cases accelerating local ethnic conflicts. 30 However, even when local cadres are recruited, the fact that they serve at the discretion of the russian president has functioned to reverse much of the character of russian ethno-federalism, injecting it with a strong soviet flavor. in sum, the continuing lack of genuine minority voice within institutions of power in the region should be a cause for considerable concern, especially since voice in the policymaking process is one of the key paths for preventing the outbreak or renewal of ethnic violence in the region.
Inequality and social Justice for Minorities
Perhaps the greatest achievement of the soviet state in the realm of nationalities policy was in promoting social equality between ethnic groups. as a number of studies have shown, soviet affirmative action policies functioned as a massive machine for upward mobility for most nationalities of the soviet Union. 31 While the violence of stalinist policies and restrictions on cultural expression may have created other social injustices, the soviet state did attempt to address aspirations toward social equality among nationalities by promoting ethnic quotas at the university and in the workplace, leading to the relatively rapid growth of native intelligentsias and (in some cases) working classes among groups that, for the most part, had been predominantly rural and peasant prior to the onset of soviet rule.
The transition to a market economy opened up new sources of inequality between ethnic groups in the postcommunist era. Privatization and the redistribution of state property often had an ethnic dimension, and ethnic groups weathered the transition to the market differentially. studies show that in Ukraine, for instance, controlling for other factors, russian-speakers earn considerably higher wages than Ukrainian-speakers-due mainly to the differential opportunities that face them in the Ukrainian economy. 32 sometimes political exclusion has pushed minority ethnic groups into the market in greater numbers than politically dominant groups, particularly if they have differential access to economic resources. 33 such patterns can foster resentment on the part of dominant groups and have even fueled ethnic violence. in the Osh region of kyrgyzstan, the monopolization of state sector jobs (including the police and the courts) by kyrgyz due to language requirements for state employment forced local Uzbeks to find a niche in the business sector, leading to accusations that the Uzbek minority was becoming wealthy at the expense of the kyrgyz and fueling animosity against them. These resentments burst out into anti-Uzbek riots in april 2010 at the time of the overthrow of the Bakiyev regime, leaving hundreds dead in their wake. 34 in post-communist russia (as in all post-communist states) the gap between rich and poor increased tremendously as a result of the transition to the market, and this has had enormous implications for ethnic stratification. Within russia, levels of poverty are driven in significant part by regional patterns of economic growth, with areas of exportable resource wealth and high levels of foreign investment performing better than other regions. as a result, russia's ethnic regions remain among the poorest areas of russia. in 2009, for example, 13 percent of the population of russia as a whole lived below the official subsistence level. However, the proportion of the local population that lived below the official subsistence level in 2009 was 36 percent in ingushetia and kalmykia, 32 percent in the altai republic, 28 percent in Tyva, 25 percent in Mari-el, 20 percent in Chuvashia and sakha, 19 percent in Buriatiia, Mordovia, adygeia, and khakassia, 17 percent in karelia and the komi republic, and 16 percent in kabardino-Balkaria and karachai-Cherkessia (data are not even published for Chechnya, although undoubtedly the degree of poverty there is very high). The only non-russian republics to have proportions of their populations below the subsistence level at a lower rate than the national average were Bashkortostan, Dagestan, and Tatarstan. 35 Moreover, central government transfers to russian regions are not distributed in such a way as to reduce levels of regional inequality or based on the number of needy constituents within a region.
36 nearly all post-soviet states have abandoned the pursuit of social policy aimed at trying to narrow income or opportunity gaps between nationalities in the post-communist period. indeed, the nationalization of the state has generally meant that states tend to be indifferent or even hostile toward minorities seeking social justice.
Conclusion: Beyond the Nationalities Question?
While the collapse of the soviet Union altered tremendously the configuration of power in eurasia, the nationality issues that played such a critical role in fueling the soviet collapse have hardly dissipated, but remain very much a part of the eurasian landscape. The situation facing minorities in eurasia has both improved and deteriorated in relation to the soviet experience. The type of violent terror that was once practiced by the soviet state as a tool of cultural politics is no longer part of the repertoire of politics in the region. in most parts of the former soviet Union, issues associated with cultural difference are openly discussed, and groups engage in autonomous self-organization in ways that could not have been imagined in soviet days. However, the nationalization of the post-soviet state has also created new problems that did not exist in soviet times. Political and social discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, the continued absence of minority voice, and inequality between ethnic groups have grown considerably in the wake of the collapse of soviet power. in short, the ethnic challenges that fueled the soviet collapse have not dissipated; they have instead transformed and morphed into different types of challenges-challenges that were not foreseen at the time of the soviet collapse, but which have proved to be equally vexing to the construction of a multiethnic and multicultural order in eurasia.
Notes

